These days there is a great deal of confusion regarding the objectives that Kiev can set in this struggle for survival. Accomplices are the secrecy with which the Ukrainian general staff has wrapped up its military structure, the impulse of the newspapers to promulgate bombastic headlines and the reorganization of the Russian forces in view of an offensive against the Joint Forces Operation (JFO), the Ukrainian war front against the pro-Russian Donbass militias.
Is it possible that the unthinkable happens? Is it conceivable that the Ukrainian David could launch a counter-offensive against the Russian Goliath? While it is true that the weapons supplied by the European Union and NATO are more than just slingshots, it is advisable not to be overwhelmed by the enthusiasm for a possible reconquest of the occupied territories.
Recognizing that the Russian withdrawal from the capital and the halt to the offensives towards Odessa and Kharkhiv are mainly due to the mistakes made by the invader does not detract from the value of the defenders, nor from the unexpected competence of the Ukrainian army. However, it remains illusory to think that the government finds itself acting in a strategic context that favors a rapid reconquest of the territories lost in the first month of the war.
The situation continues to be critical despite the risk of a military collapse being averted. The capital is no longer under direct threat of a siege, but will still remain vulnerable to air strikes and missiles cruise and ballistics from Belarus.
In the south it is highly unlikely that the invader will loosen his grip around the Kherson and Mikolayiv area, where more manageable logistical lines will incentivize the Russians to consolidate their rear and impose a more or less effective occupation at the Crimean outlet. In the east, the hope of liberating Mariupol is now reduced to zero, and the shift of the Russian forces’ center of gravity towards Izyum will allow the Russians to concentrate their forces along a shorter front line than in the first weeks of the war.
It is likely that the invaders will try it all by mounting an attack along this north-south directive, trying to cut Ukrainian troops in the JFO from the rest of the country. The success of this operation is not taken for granted. A shorter front favors the defenders, who know the Donbass better and can count on the same advantages as in the north of the country: logistically, it will be very difficult to advance towards Dnipro without capturing Kharkiv, with all the disadvantages of another long urban siege.
However, more modest goals such as surrounding the Ukrainian salient at Severiodonetsk seem more within reach, even if the terrain will prove quite problematic (the streams and woods north of Kramatorsk will be even less navigable due to the spring muds). Prioritizing operations in this area will also allow for the concentration of air sorties and support from Russian missile formations, perhaps allowing the Russian operational doctrine to be applied in a more organized manner.
Understanding the possible moves of the Kremlin is fundamental to understanding the type of offensive operations the Ukrainians will be able to carry out. The counterattacks we have seen so far have concentrated in areas where the Russians were already in retreat or in regions where the invader had not yet managed to consolidate his conquests. It is also likely that the Ukrainians will be able to launch local attacks to disorganize the Russian formations that are positioning themselves for new offensives.
However, the lack of material and the Russian material advantage will prevent offensives in a big way, suggesting rather the creation of a defense in depth thanks to the new Western systems (especially the Switchblade Americans, which allow you to hit the opponent’s logistic lines in depth).
Some NATO countries, in particular the Czech Republic, have started sending heavy vehicles (including the BMP-1 infantry armored vehicle and the T-72 tank) from the former Warsaw Pact arsenals. These models are known to Ukrainian operators and will be equipped very quickly. However, it is doubtful whether the West has sufficient means and spare parts at its disposal to support Ukrainian formations engaged in a ground offensive.
As a rule, the attackers are always in a position of vulnerability, and in Donbass (as well as in other areas of the front) the Ukrainians are not equipped with anti-aircraft systems capable of denying the operations of the Russian Air Force. The logistical hubs in the rear remain exposed to Russian blows; trying to organize complex offensives would jeopardize the Ukrainian defense system with the prospect of huge losses. Added to this is that in the medium term a transition to Western systems will be necessary to make up for the shortage of post-Soviet systems, and it will take time for Kiev to integrate these new means into its arsenal. Until then, Ukraine will not be able to afford unnecessary losses, although it is possible to imagine an attempt to retake Kherson if the Russian forces defending the city are particularly weakened.
From now on, the most realistic goal for Ukrainian forces will be to maintain a high level of attrition for Russian operations. Friction “is the force that makes apparently easy so difficult”, to quote Clausewitz: the accumulation of small errors, accidents and losses not due to large operations that in the medium term render an army unable to fight effectively. The Russian logistical incompetence in the early stages of the war makes the invader particularly susceptible to operational friction, and if the Ukrainians succeed in engaging the Russians in a war of attrition in the next few weeks as well (also exhausting them with hit-and-run and offensive attacks local), then the Kremlin will be forced to make rather unpleasant decisions.
On the Russian side, the shortage of contract soldiers is already making itself felt, even if in the coming weeks it is possible that Moscow will try to bring the units already theoretically engaged in the field to 100% of the personnel. A typical Russian battalion (which itself can generate up to three batallion tactical groups, the reference unit for this operation) stands at three quarters of the troops in times of peace, and to complete each unit would require a general mobilization and the recall of conscription units.
If the losses continue to no avail and the war continues, what else could Russia do but stop operations or trigger a wider escalation? Both perspectives do not lack advantages for Kiev.
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